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Educationalizing the Welfare State and Privatizing Education 
THE EVOLUTION OF SOCIAL POLICY SINCE THE NEW DEAL 
Harvey Kantor and Robert Lowe 
BELIEF IN THE capacity of public education to redress unequal opportunity and 
eliminate poverty is one of the most distinctive features of American social pol-
icy. It is especially evident in No Child Left Behind (NCLB), which has invoked 
an equality-of-results test of public school performance that neglects conditions 
inside and outside the schools that contribute to inequality. But belief in the effi-
cacy of education to protect against the risks and uncertainties of the free market 
is hardly a new development in federal policy. For a half century, ever since Lyndon 
Johnson prioritized education over the project of building on the New Deal to cre-
ate a robust welfare state, educational reform has been the federal government's 
favored solution to problems of poverty, inequality, and economic insecurity. 
This faith in the power of education historically has justified greater access to 
schooling for low-income children as well as the investment of additional resources 
in the schools that serve them. But the idea that inequality and poverty are sus-
ceptible to educational correction has also had several less desirable consequences. 
It has not only reduced pressure on the state for other social policies that might 
more directly ameliorate economic distress; because education's capacity to redis-
tribute opportunity has been limited by the absence of social policies that directly 
address poverty and economic inequality, it has also fueled disillusionment with 
public education itself for its failure to solve problems that are beyond its reach. In 
the current social and political context, this disillusion has generated support for 
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market-oriented and business-based forms of education and social provision that 
threaten to deepen inequality rather than reduce it. 1 In this chapter, we examine 
the intensification of policy making around these strategies of educational reform 
by situating it within the history of education and social policy from the New Deal 
to the era of No Child Left Behind. 2 
FROM THE NEW DEAL TO THE GREAT SOCIETY 
We begin with the New Deal because it institutionalized for the first time in the 
nation's history the idea that the federal government was responsible for ensuring 
the economic security and welfare of its citizens.3 Education, however, played only 
an incidental role in the federal government's efforts to address these problems. 
Although President Franklin Roosevelt had no interest in providing federal finan-
cial assistance for public education, his New Deal spawned several education-related 
programs to respond to the ravages of the Depression. Most notably, the Civil 
Works Administration, predecessor to the Works Progress Administration (WPA), 
built and repaired a significant number of school buildings and hired thousands 
of unemployed teachers; the National Youth Administration offered work-study 
programs to high school and college students; the Civilian Conservation Corps 
provided some schooling to the young men it hired to do conservation work; and, 
more innovatively, the Federal Art Project and Federal Theater Project promoted 
cultural education. None of these was intended primarily as an educational proj-
ect, however. In keeping with the New Deal's emphasis on economic relief and 
recovery, their chief purposes were either to provide jobs and income to the unem-
ployed or to reduce the competition for jobs by keeping young people out of the 
labor market. When World War II increased the demand for labor, political sup-
port for New Deal work relief programs evaporated, and Congress abolished all of 
them before the war ended.4 
Although the New Deal did not institutionalize public job creation, other New 
Deal programs intended to provide a measure of economic security and protection 
against the uncertainties of the market had staying power. These included a mini-
mum wage, unemployment insurance, retirement benefits, federal support for 
public assistance, and the right of workers to organize. For a moment in the late 
1930S and early 1940s, it appeared that a social democratic agenda might extend 
these benefits to the point where the federal government's responsibility for its 
citizens' economic and social welfare would approach the provisions of the welfare 
states being erected in northern and western Europe. These postwar social dem-
ocratic governments in Europe sought to reduce unemployment and economic 
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deprivation by institutionalizing labor and income policies to guarantee a mini-
mum standard of living. By the 1960s, however, this robust view of economic and 
social provision in America would be replaced by a focus on education. Instead of 
dealing with problems of social disadvantage and economic insecurity by expand-
ing this nascent welfare state, President Lyndon Johnson's Great Society would 
seek to address these problems mainly through compensatory education and job 
training policies. These policies aimed not to protect the least advantaged from the 
inequities and uncertainties of the labor market, but rather to develop individuals' 
human capital so that they might participate in it.s 
This evolution in social policy was propelled by several factors: Johnson's per-
sonal belief in the power of education; the way policymakers had come to think 
about the causes of poverty and economic disadvantage, especially their commit-
ment to the idea of a culture of poverty; and strategic political attempts to dis-
tance the liberal agenda from anything resembling collectivism during the Cold 
War. 6 But the broadest context for this change was set by two other postwar devel-
opments. One was the containment of organized labor's social democratic agenda 
within collective bargaining agreements .7 The other was the NAACP's decision to 
prioritize school desegregation efforts in its attack on racial inequality.8 Private 
negotiations between workers and employers over wages and fringe benefits, 
together with African American demands for school desegregation, reduced politi-
cal pressure on the state for public job creation, income redistribution, and other 
social benefits. Instead, social policy making was reoriented around educational 
reform. 9 
The Great Society's focus on education certainly did not exclude other forms 
of public social provision. It created Medicare and Medicaid and devoted some 
resources to food stamps. In addition, the need to staff other social programs 
expanded employment opportunities for African Americans, Latinos, and the 
poor. For the most part, however, the Great Society did not expand on the steps 
the New Deal had taken toward building a floor under incomes and providing 
public jobs for the poor. Absent a broad-based constituency in favor of a more 
expansive welfare state, it turned instead to less intrusive, more politically palat-
able proposals. These included tax cuts to stimulate economic growth, educational 
initiatives, and job-training programs designed to help those on the margins 
without antagonizing business by interfering directly in the labor market or with-
out alienating White middle- and working-class voters by transferring income to 
African Americans and the poor. Johnson continually referred to this strategy as 
a "hand-up not a hand-out."1o 
Ironically, it was Richard Nixon who contemplated offering an expanded sys-
tem of social benefits. For a time, he supported a strategy of direct payments to 
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individuals, such as increasing spending on food stamps, indexing Social Security 
payments to inflation, and creating a federal income guarantee for the aged, blind, 
and disabled poor (Supplemental Security Income, or SSI). At the same time Nixon 
supported income security, he simultaneously tried to limit the growth of federal 
spending on education and other Great Society programs such as the Job Corps 
and Community Action. In the end, however, Nixon was neither deeply committed 
to universalizing the federal government's responsibility for income security, nor 
was he successful in limiting the federal commitment to education. Criticized by 
liberals who thought he set benefit levels too low and by conservatives who were 
opposed to extending "welfare" to employed workers, he gave up on a proposal 
for a guaranteed annual income (the Family Assistance Plan) and, under'pressure 
from "pro-family" conservatives, vetoed the Comprehensive Child Development 
Act, which would have provided federal funding for child care, 11 At the same time, 
a bipartisan coalition in Congress thwarted his effort to limit the federal com-
mitment to education, which resulted in increased federal spending for the Great 
Society's education programs.12 
Nixon's retreat did not preclude other efforts to institutionalize more expansive 
protections against economic risk. Jimmy Carter liberalized eligibility for food 
stamps and expanded the Comprehensive Employment and Training Act (CETA), 
first passed in 1973, which provided public service jobs to the unemployed. He 
also tried to put a guaranteed annual income measure (Program for Better Jobs 
and Income) back on the social policy agenda. But, committed to budgetary 
restraint, he only pushed halfheartedly for it; and by the end of his term, he had 
come to believe that combating inflation and reducing the federal budget deficit 
required a reduction in expenditures for CETA and other social welfare programs. '3 
Instead, he sought to raise the visibility of education in the federal bureaucracy 
by advocating and winning congressional approval for a cabinet-level Department 
of Education.14 As a result, Carter wound up reinforcing the central place educa-
tion had come to occupy in the nation's system of social provision while setting 
in motion the antigovernment rhetoric, particularly the idea that excessive gov-
ernment spending on social welfare was the chief cause of the nation's economic 
problems, that has been the central theme in debates about social policy ever since 
Ronald Reagan's election.1s 
RACE AND THE POLITICS OF EDUCATION IN THE GREAT SOCIETY 
Although the Great Society embraced a more restricted conception of the benefits 
the state can provide than did the New Deal, it was much more racially inclusive. 
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In its efforts to alleviate distress and provide for the needy, the New Deal had 
certainly included African Americans and Latinos. With some notable exceptions, 
however (such as the program to fund Black graduate students set up by Mary 
MacLeod Bethune in the National Youth Administration and the modest affir-
mative action program that Harold Ickes initiated within the short-lived Public 
Works Administration), New Deal agencies took no action to counter racial dis-
crimination. Minimum wage and maximum hour legislation, old-age benefits, and 
unemployment insurance excluded agricultural and domestic workers, who were 
disproportionately African American and Latino; the right to bargain collectively 
did little for those African American and Latino workers whom unions excluded 
from membership and, through the closed shop, from factory jobs altogether; and 
the Federal Housing Administration discriminated against African American and 
Latino home buyers by restricting federal mortgage guarantees to white neighbor-
hoods. In sum, while the New Deal did not exclude African Americans and Latinos, 
its programs, as well as the passage of the GI Bill in ~944, rested rather easily with 
white supremacy and played a major role in both intensifying residential segrega-
tion and creating the racial disparities in wealth that continue to shape educa-
tional inequality today.16 
In contrast to the New Deal, the Great Society sought to address racial discrim-
ination. Although this concern for racial equality embraced Latinos and Native 
Americans, the main catalyst for it was the need to address the demands of African 
Americans.17 In responding to pressure from the civil rights movement, Congress 
passed the ~964 Civil Rights Act, the Voting Rights Act of ~965, and the ~968 Fair 
Housing Act. Together, these measures sought to "undo the racial legacy of the 
New Deal" and to integrate African Americans into the welfare state by outlawing 
segregation in public accommodations, affirming African American voting rights, 
prohibiting the distribution of federal funds to racially segregated institutions, and 
extending civil rights protections to the labor and housing markets.18 This legisla-
tion also empowered the federal government to intervene in states and localities 
to guarantee these rights, though the strong enforcement provisions that African 
Americans and many White liberals desired were typically watered down before 
final passage, especially in employment and housing. 
The centerpiece of Great Society education legislation, Title I of the ~965 
Elementary and Secondary Education Act (ESEA), promised to help African 
Americans by providing much-needed financial aid to schools that served 
low-income students, particularly in the South and in big cities. Title I, however, 
was not responsive to Black demands, which in the early ~96os focused mainly 
on school desegregation. Title I, in fact, was quite compatible with the persis-
tence of racially segregated institutions. For this reason, the NAACP, other civil 
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rights groups, and a few White liberals denied that the program was a meaningful 
response to the problem of racial inequality in the schools.~9 
I t is not clear whether this preference for compensation rather than desegrega-
tion was intentional. Certainly, Commissioner of Education Francis Keppel and his 
successor, Harold Howe, believed that the passage of Title I would provide southern 
school districts with an incentive to comply with Title VI of the Civil Rights Act, 
which prohibited the distribution of federal funds to segregated schools. 20 But that 
is not how things turned out. Although most observers credit the threat of fund 
deferrals for pushing southern school systems from intransigent defiance to token 
acceptance of school desegregation, linking the implementation of Title I to the 
enforcement of Title VI produced a backlash in Congress that threatened the very 
survival of Title I and other Great Society education programs. 21 Consequently, 
President Johnson pressured Health, Education and Welfare officials to weaken 
the program's ties to federal desegregation efforts as the price the administration 
had to pay to ensure its continuation. 
This trade-off did not eliminate subsequent conflicts over the connection 
between Title I and desegregation. In the early 1970S, the reauthorization of Title 
I became entangled with Nixon's efforts to win congressional approval for legal 
restrictions on school busing. Because of opposition from liberals in Congress, 
the most restrictive features of anti-busing measures that sought to limit court 
action failed. But when Congress reauthorized Title I in 1974, it not only limited 
the federal government's power to enforce Title VI of the Civil Rights Act but also 
prohibited the use of federal funds for busing. By then, even many who once con-
sidered themselves advocates of civil rights, particularly northern liberals who 
represented urban districts and were under pressure from their White constitu-
ents to oppose court-ordered busing, had begun to think of Title I as a substitute 
for, rather than a complement to, federal desegregation efforts.22 
RACE, THE LIMITS OF REDISTRIBUTION, AND 
THE PERSISTENCE OF EDUCATIONAL REFORM 
Although educational reform appealed to policy makers because it appeared to be 
a politically palatable alternative to more direct forms of intervention in the labor 
market and because it was less expensive than a more expansive system of publicly 
funded social provision, the Great Society's strategy of relying on the provision 
of additional educational resources to low-income and minority children turned 
out to face its own obstacles. Since Title I posed no threat to segregated insti-
tutions and built new networks of professional, political, and financial interests 
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committed to its survival, it turned out to be remarkably resilient. But because 
of poor implementation, insufficient funding, and the way available funds were 
disbursed, it never operated as more than a "modest supplement to very unequally 
distributed state and local educational resources."23 Consequently, it did much less 
to improve educational outcomes for low-income students than its proponents 
initially hoped it would.24 
School desegregation was a more robust method of redistribution. In contrast 
to Title I, which did not disturb power relations between the races, it sought to 
root out racial inequality by providing African American students with access to 
the superior resources of the schools White students attended. In doing so, how-
ever, it threatened white exclusivity, inspired massive White resistance, and pro-
ceeded at a glacial pace until the Supreme Court acted in the late 1960s to strike 
down freedom-of-choice plans that had failed to produce more than token deseg-
regation. The court subsequently legitimated the use of school busing and began 
to require remedies for racially segregated schools in the North and West as well 
as the South. Though these actions were compromised by the unequal burden of 
busing, school closures, and teacher layoffs imposed on African American stu-
dents and communities, and by the persistence of discriminatory practices within 
desegregated schools, they marked a sharp departure from Jim Crow schooling; 
opened up access to greater educational resources for African American students, 
especially for African Americans in the rural South; and helped accelerate Black 
educational progress.25 
But this more assertive stance was short-lived. As the Black Freedom Movement 
challenged the distinction between de jure and de facto segregation that had lim-
ited desegregation to the cities and protected suburban housing markets and 
school districts from court-ordered integration, the already tenuous political sup-
port for more affirmative policies evaporated, and further action was rejected by 
officials in all three branches of government. Anxious to cultivate political sup-
port among White, middle-class suburbanites opposed to metropolitan remedies, 
Nixon, Ford, Carter, and Reagan all reaffirmed the de jure/de facto distinction and 
opposed busing across school district lines. So did bipartisan majorities in both 
houses of Congress, and, most importantly, a majority of justices on the Supreme 
Court. Transformed by the appointment of four Nixon nominees, the Supreme 
Court moved in 1973 to protect the financial advantages of property-rich subur-
ban districts (San Antonio v. Rodriguez), and a year later it began a long retreat 
from its insistence that districts in violation of Brown v. Board of Education take 
aggressive action to overcome segregation when it reversed a lower court that had 
challenged the "housing/education nexus" and mandated urban-suburban deseg-
regation in Detroit (Milliken 11. Bradley). Subsequent school desegregation plans 
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focused on voluntary urban-suburban transfers and magnet programs designed 
to hold White students in city school systems or attract them from the suburbs. 
Because they left intact the fusion of residential segregation and suburban politi-
cal autonomy, however, they did not do much to alter the racial composition of 
most urban or suburban schools. 26 
The accumulated experience of Title I and desegregation ultimately eroded 
the intellectual credibility of the former and the political credibility of the latter. 
Although both programs continued to have steadfast advocates both inside and 
outside Congress, by the early 1980s the logic that had motivated and sustained 
these policies had vanished, and few policy makers saw them as viable approaches 
to the redistribution of educational or economic opportunity.27 By institutionaliz-
ing the idea that poverty and income insecurity were chiefly matters of education, 
however, the Great Society actually increased expectations about what education 
could accomplish. As a result, the federal commitment to education and its role 
in social policy remained firmly in place despite the backlash against the Great 
Society's own educational programs.28 
While the Great Society's commitment to federal policy making in education 
had won widespread support, even among many conservatives, disillusionment 
with its educational initiatives precluded further expansion of compensatory or 
redistributionist strategies of reform. In the 1970s, Title VI of the 1964 Civil Rights 
Act provided the rationale for the extension of civil rights protections to English 
language learners and disabled children, and Title I of ESEA remained the pro-
grammatic foundation on which future federal education policies would be built. 
But by the 1980s, federal policy no longer embodied the idea that the government 
should intervene to alter the arrangements that resulted in the segregation of 
African American and Latino students in underperforming schools or to compen-
sate them for their unequal access to educational resources. Federal policy focused 
instead on trying to improve their educational outcomes without disturbing the 
advantages of the wealthiest schools and their predominantly White, middle-class 
clientele. 
FROM THE GREAT SOCIETY TO THE ENABLING STATE 
Between 1970 and 2000 the programmatic legacy of the New Deal/Great Society 
welfare state and the ideological consensus that sustained it was challenged by the 
popularization of a different conception of the role of the state in social policy. In 
contrast to the New Deal, which sought to build a minimal floor under incomes, 
and the Great Society, which sought to extend opportunity through the expansion 
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of social services such as education and job training, this new view of the state's 
role in social policy proposed to limit the federal government's responsibility for 
income security and to restructure the system of social provision by minimizing 
direct redistributive measures in favor of more market-oriented forms of social 
protection.29 
Nothing in this transformation altered the trajectory set in motion during 
the 1960s that placed educational reform at the center of social policy making. 
To the contrary, as political support for more expansive forms of publicly pro-
vided social provision eroded, belief in what education might accomplish actually 
became stronger, and policy making around education intensified. In fact, despite 
the widespread disillusionment with Great Society liberalism that became evident 
in the early 1970S and accelerated over the next three decades, when we view the 
years since 1980 through the prism of educational policy, we see a reassertion of 
the preference to offer protection to citizens against the uncertainties of the mar-
ket by reformulating the problems of poverty, inequality, and income insecurity in 
terms of economic growth and educational achievement. 
Our argument here is partially at odds with current thinking about the history 
of education and the welfare state that views the emphasis on educational pol-
icy since 1980 as symbolic of a shift away from the "social insurance type welfare 
state" inherited from the New Deal toward what Neil Gilbert and Barbara Gilbert 
have called an "enabling state."30 The decades since 1980, in fact, have more in com-
mon with the past than it appears at first glance once we recognize that the chief 
characteristic of the system of social provision that evolved in the 1960s was not 
so much its efforts to expand the social insurance and welfare policies inherited 
from the New Deal as its reliance on education as an alternative to more interven-
tionist policies to reduce poverty and economic distress and promote job security, 
employment, and economic opportunity. 
What has distinguished the last thirty years is not the reliance on "enabling" 
measures but the broader shift in the ideological context of social policy. Though 
the Great Society turned to education as an alternative to direct public expendi-
tures on social provision or assertive interventions in the labor market, it did not 
seek to reduce the income supports put in place during the New Deal or to dis-
mantle the system of employment-based benefits it inherited. Rather, the Great 
Society sought to incorporate the poor and people of color into this system by 
promoting economic growth and by equalizing the conditions of educational pro-
vision. By contrast, the dominant trend in social policy after 1980 has been to 
minimize dependence on the state by placing responsibility for coping with eco-
nomic risk on individuals and families , while relying more heavily on education 
to promote self-reliance, individual responsibility, and labor market participation. 
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Thus we have been witnessing the apparent paradox of even more intensive federal 
intervention in education coupled with efforts to minimize federal responsibility 
for other forms of social and economic provision.31 
This shift in policy can be attributed in part to the effects of globalization and 
deindustrialization, most importantly the post-1973 slowdown in industrial pro-
ductivity and economic growth, which put pressure on the federal budgetY But 
the diminution of the federal commitment to forms of social provision other than 
education was hardly an inevitable response to the effects of economic change on 
the federal budget. What tipped the balance were changes in the ways different 
groups and classes viewed the government's relationship to the market and its role 
in social provision and their relative power to influence politics and governmental 
policy making. 
Among these changes, much scholarly attention has focused on the escalating 
backlash from blue-collar workers and middle-income suburbanites who, wor-
ried about urban decline and rising tax rates, rebelled against social policies they 
believed catered to the needs of people of color and the poor at their expense. 33 More 
important, however, was the political mobilization of business leaders. Faced with 
declining profits and an increasingly competitive international economic environ-
ment, they turned their backs on the employment-based system of public/private 
provision they had helped to construct after World War II. Instead, they proposed 
to "infuse a capitalist ethos" into the politics of social provision and financed the 
creation of an unprecedented number of new business associations, think tanks, 
foundations, and lobbying organizations to develop an intellectual rationale for 
applying market-oriented principles to social policy and to elect political leaders 
who supported those principles.34 
Social Security and Medicare, which served the elderly and benefited a broad 
working- and middle-class constituency, persisted despite these pressures. So did 
SSI which served those whom policy makers considered to be the "deserving poor." 
But absent an "effective political counterweight"35 willing or able to challenge the 
logic of the market and the legitimacy of large corporations, the effect of this busi-
ness mobilization and the proliferation of conservative and free-market think 
tanks it sponsored was to shift the terrain of debate in favor of the idea that public 
social provision could not ameliorate the problems it was intended to solve but 
in fact had made them worse by discouraging work, encouraging dependence on 
the state, and interfering with economic growth. The result was social policy that 
sought to reduce direct public provision in favor of programs, such as Temporary 
Assistance to Needy Families (TANF) and the Earned Income Tax Credit (EITC), 
which limited access to welfare and encouraged work and educational reforms that 
aimed to prepare children from poor families to participate more successfully in 
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the labor market so that they could deal with economic risk through their own 
efforts.36 
This reorientation did not go uncontested. Concerned about deteriorating 
wages and growing income inequality, in the 1980s a few liberal Democrats led 
by Representative George Miller, Senator Ted Kennedy, and members of the 
Congressional Black Caucus supported greater funding for education programs in 
association with policies for full employment, health care, housing, and a mini-
mum standard of living.37 However, after the failure of Carter's proposal for a guar-
anteed income in 1978 and the termination of CETA in 1982, neither Republicans 
nor Democrats sought to combine education policy with a thoroughgoing system 
of income support, family allowances, or public employment. They turned instead 
to an expansion of education policy as a way to minimize the demand for more 
robust public policies to alleviate economic insecurity. Republicans, with support 
from many moderate Democrats, pushed a combination of tax and deficit reduc-
tion policies that constrained the government's capacity to fund other forms of 
social provision.38 
THE REINVENTION OF THE EDUCATIONAL STATE 
Based on the conviction that the expansion of educational policy making would 
foster and help legitimate the reorientation of the welfare state around a new 
social contract, which its supporters referred to as "public support for private 
responsibility," this movement extended the federal government's preference-
first evidenced in the 1960s-for providing economic security through education. 
But this movement rejected the idea that the federal government should intervene 
to address the effects of economic disadvantage and racial segregation. Hostile to 
redistributionist strategies of reform, it sought instead to remodel the education 
system in accordance with the same principles that were restructuring the rest of 
the welfare state. The result has been a reorientation of education policy around 
market-based and business-derived models of organization that heightened expec-
tations for education but left intact inequities between schools with wealthier stu-
dents and those with large numbers of low-income and students of color. 
Led by a coalition of business and political elites,39 this movement coalesced 
in the 1990S around two forms of state action, one based on public financing for 
privately provided educational services (e.g. , vouchers and other forms of priva-
tization) and the other based on a corporate model of organization that empha-
sized local responsibility in return for centralized regulation of specific, measured 
school outcomes. Different in orientation, these strategies nonetheless shared the 
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assumption that school failure had less to do with class- and race-based inequities 
in the conditions of educational provision than with the lack of accountability for 
how schools used the resources they had to educate their students.40 
Voucher experiments were instituted in some urban school systems, most 
notably Milwaukee and Cleveland, and a few states have adopted limited 
non-means-tested voucher plans and voucherlike tax credit policiesY No state 
or school district, however, has yet fully embraced the idea of publicly financing 
private schooling where accountability is determined by a school's capacity to 
attract and retain voucher-bearing students. But much of this market-oriented 
idea has now been incorporated into public systems across the country in the form 
of charter schools and charter-school networks, which frequently contract with 
private companies to run the schools. Today there are over 5 ,000 charter schools 
in 40 states serving over 1.5 million students (see Scott and Wells , chapter 9, this 
volume) Y Because they technically remain public, charters have not satisfied the 
most ardent advocates of privatization and market-based reform. Yet by restruc-
turing public systems around the principles of flexibility, competition, and choice, 
they have begun to transform long-standing conceptions of public responsibility 
in education, not only individualizing responsibility but also putting families in 
competition with one another for access to educational resources at the expense 
of more collective remedies intended to address the racial and economic arrange-
ments on which public school systems have long been based.43 
Still more influential among federal policymakers has been the idea of 
accountability-based reform, which culminated the year after George W. Bush's 
election with the passage of the No Child Left Behind Act (hereafter, "NCLB") in 
2001.44 The most significant federal initiative since the passage of ESEA in 1965, 
NCLB codified the rejection of compensatory and redistributionist strategies 
of educational reform. Although it took incremental steps to concentrate more 
money in high-poverty schools, its main goal was to use federal policy to reorient 
public education around the principles of business organization on the assump-
tion that the chief problem facing American education had less to do with the 
inequitable distribution of resources than with the bureaucratic arrangements 
that protected underperforming schools from the consequences of failure . To 
remedy this required states to set minimum proficiency standards for all stu-
dents and to implement a prescribed set of sanctions against schools that failed 
to meet them, including access to public school choice, the provision of private 
supplementary educational services, and state-mandated restructuring of local 
schools.45 
A number of state and local school officials as well as advocates of states' rights 
in education opposed this strategy of reform.46 But its emphasis on accountability 
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received support from several other groups. It was attractive, for example, to 
many suburban Whites wh o favored expanding educational opportunities for the 
least advantaged while preserving their own access to good schools. Yet, because 
it effectively shifted the blame for educational failure from the child to the school, 
it was also popular with some civil rights organizations, Black and Latino parents, 
and liberal advocacy groups. These organizations and groups believed that account-
ability offered a more robust sense of opportunity than Title I, which had been 
framed in a language of cultural deprivation that blamed poor children for their 
own educational failures. It also appeared at first glance to have been responsive to 
the view held by many African American educators that, contrary to what James 
Coleman, Christopher Jencks, and other sociologists seemed to imply,47 schools 
do indeed matter, especially for low-income children and children of color, and 
that, in the post-civil rights era, racially and economically segregated schools and 
school systems can be organized to foster high achievement and promote greater 
economic opportunity.48 
Although NCLB appeared to many to have embraced a broader vision of equal 
opportunity than the policies that preceded it,49 those hopes were soon dashed. 
While it rightly rejected the stigmatizing practices that had often accompanied the 
Great Society's compensatory programs and depressed the educational achieve-
ment of low-income children, NCLB, like Title I, more often functioned to repro-
duce educational inequality than reduce it. This time, however, the result was not 
due primarily to reformers' deficit assumptions about the intellectual capacities 
of African American, Latino, and low-income children. It was due rather to the 
fact that the application of NCLB's provisions to unequal schools typically wound 
up reinforcing class- and race-based differences in access to educational resources 
rather than increasing the resources available to those who lacked them. 
Why and how this happened became apparent when researchers began study-
ing the consequences of the NCLB's requirement that test scores be disaggregated 
by subgroup. This provision was included in NCLB at the insistence of liberals in 
Congress who believed that aggregated scores obscured differences in achieve-
ment between different groups of students. But because teachers and administra-
tors in schools with large numbers of low-income students and students of color 
faced the historically insurmountable barrier of annually raising the test scores 
of multiple subgroups, including special education students, so that all of them 
attained the same level of proficiency, they sought to meet this goal by narrow-
ing the curricula in their schools to focus on preparation for the requisite tests 
in reading and mathematics at the expense of other subjects.so At the same time, 
middle-class schools, which typically had fewer subgroups, made few changes in 
their regular practices but continued to offer a relatively enriched curriculumY In 
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this way, the disaggregation of test scores by subgroup, which was NCLB's most 
progressive feature, actually produced regressive results. 
Theoretically, NCLB's provisions for choice, as well as the growth of charter 
schools, offered low-income students the opportunity to escape this predicament. 
But choice plans also encountered obstacles. Not only did the act's provisions for 
choice offer no incentives for high performing districts to accept students from 
lower-scoring urban schools, whom they feared would bring down their own 
school's test scores and thereby subject them to federal sanctions,52 but the lack 
of availability of a sufficient number of good public and charter schools in urban 
districts continued to limit the opportunities for low-income families to partici-
pate in the education marketplace.53 As a result, more options typically did not 
translate into more opportunity. 
EDUCATION, THE ENABLING STATE, AND THE OBAMA ADMINISTRATION 
Barack Obama has tried to alter the balance between public and private respon-
sibility in economic and social policy, but he has not tried to substitute public for 
private authority in the market or alter the structure of the compromised welfare 
state he inherited. Rather, faced with the worst economic crisis in over half a cen-
tury, he proposed and passed an economic recovery bill that focused on federal 
support for state governments and spending for privately contracted construction 
projects to relieve unemployment and encourage economic stabilization, much as 
Roosevelt's Public Works Administration did in the early days of the New Deal.S4 
Similarly, his plan to expand access to health care relies on federal subsidies to uni-
versalize privately provided health insurance. That these measures have provoked 
so much opposition speaks more to how much the ideological reinvigoration of 
antistatism that began in the 1970S has intensified differences about what activi-
ties the federal government should carry out than it does to any dramatic expan-
sion Obama proposed to the welfare state. 
Despite some efforts to modify the direction of social policy, nowhere has Obama 
proposed to reduce the nation's reliance on education as its chief bulwark against 
poverty and economic insecurity or to alter the direction of the education policy 
he inherited. He not only continues to tout education as "the best antipoverty 
program" and the key to individual and national well-being,55 but he also remains 
committed to reconstructing public education in accordance with market-oriented 
principles of motivation and business-based models of organization. In fact , 
though some of his supporters had hoped that he would reject these principles 
and models in favor of less competitive, more collectively oriented approaches, 
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his administration's main education initiatives-e.g., to make the receipt of Title I 
funds conditional on improvements in school performance, to accelerate the pro-
liferation of charter schools, and to improve instruction by evaluating and paying 
teachers according to students' test scores-actually constitute an intensification 
of them. Consequently, his policies have reinforced the preference for educational 
solutions to the problem of social welfare at the same time that they have confined 
debates about educational policy to technical questions such as how to manage 
schools more efficiently, measure achievement more precisely, encourage teachers 
to work harder, and manipulate incentives to maximize choice. This narrowed dis-
cussion has largely ruled out more fundamental questions about race-based and 
economic disparities in educational opportunity.56 
While the recent intensification of policy making around education has made 
school reform a national priority, it actually has diminished the ability of pub-
lic schools to equalize educational opportunity. By substituting education for 
direct forms of social provision, it has limited the federal government's capacity 
to address the poverty that destabilizes children's lives and erodes school achieve-
ment. At the same time, by substituting accountability for redistribution, it has 
further reduced the fiscal and curricular capacity of urban schools to produce the 
superior outcomes seen in the schools affluent students attend and deepened 
the sense that these schools do not merit additional public investment. A serious 
effort to equalize economic opportunity requires both a robust welfare state and 
schools with the ample resources and rich subject matter the well-to-do enjoy, free 
of tracking and the low expectations African American and Latino students often 
face (see Tyson, chapter 12, this volume). 
Despite how far social policy has strayed from these goals, signs of dissatisfac-
tion are emerging. Not only have conservative efforts to eliminate the last vestiges 
of the welfare state generated widespread opposition, but also the shortcomings 
of N CLB have begun to raise questions about the desirability of the choice and 
accountability agenda in education policy. Chastened by experience, even some 
of the most ardent advocates of choice and accountability have recently changed 
their minds about this policy agendaY Whether this dissent will alter the future 
trajectory of social and educational policy is impossible to predict. But more than 
at any time during the past two decades, it provides a glimmer of possibility that 
we can redirect social and educational policy to restore a commitment to broaden-
ing public social provision and establishing conditions both outside and inside the 
schools that will reduce disparities in opportunity and engage students in serious 
intellectual work. 
